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UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
SELECTABLE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ∗
Osamu Keida †
ABSTRACT
This paper presents an analysis of market equilibrium under the circumstances with
several discrete economic conditions by using pure exchange economy model. First,
as preliminary analysis, it will show the ‘temporal’ market equilibrium under a given
distribution of population over the diﬀerent circumstances in section 2. Next, in section
3 our study will prove the existence of market equilibrium in the case that economic
agents can choose their economic conditions freely for their utility maximization. Finally
our research tries to approximate our model to the residential location model through
the speciﬁed assumptions on initial endowments and agent’s preference, and it derives
some properties of equilibrium consumptions and prices.
Keywords: equilibrium, local goods, excess utility,
JEL classiﬁcation: D51, R13, R20
1 Introduction
We shall try to extend the ordinal market equilibrium analysis to a more general case: the
market consisted of selectable economic circumstances by using pure exchange economy
model, and then to approximate this model to the urban economic model by making
assumptions speciﬁc.
In the ordinal market model an economic agent determines the optimal behavior to
the prices of goods, and the diﬀerence between the market demand and the market supply
of each good aﬀects its price and other prices, which inﬂuences each agent’s behavior of
demand or supply again. An equilibrium solution is obtained by this repetition if it
exists.
By contrast, in urban economic models and regional economic models the prices of
some goods like land rent diﬀer depending on the locations of economic activities, and
then the consumption quantities of such goods are diﬀerent at distinct locations. The
supplies of such goods also diﬀer at every locations. Each agent of the economy selects
a locational point in order to determine his optimal economic behavior for maximal
utility or proﬁt. Thus, the eminent feature of urban economic models and regional
economic models is the choice of a locational point which means the choice of prices at
which an agent faces on his location. The agent performs utility maximization or proﬁt
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1maximization on his locational point. If the utility or proﬁt is smaller than the one
derived in other point, then the agent will change his location for a better level of utility
or proﬁt. In the end an equilibrium is attained so that the level of each agent’s utility
or proﬁt is indiﬀerent in the same group type even if his location is diﬀerent from other
agents.
We shall extend an analysis of the typical market model to show the existence of
market equilibrium of an extended model in which the choice of location means the
choice of the prices of goods dependent on locations. There has been made a lot of works
on the general equilibrium model so far. Among them we ﬁnd some platform researches
with a rigid and strict framework: Arrow and Hahn [2], Debreu [3] and Hildenbrand [3].
On the other hand we encounter some papers of axiomatic approach in urban economics
as in Turnbull[8] and [9] which spur us to make an analysis in this direction. Thus we try
to apply the results of the general equilibrium theory to the case of ‘selectable’ economic
circumstances by relying on a newer research of Villar [10] who gives us a clear-cut
procedure of proof.
To this end we shall introduce a new key concept for equilibrium:‘excess utility’,
which is a distinctive feature of this paper. We can review a lot of splendid works such
as Alonso[1], Mills[6] and Wheaton[11] in the area of urban economics. The structure of
a city: housing demand, rent, population and city size were well analyzed with compar-
ative analysis of equilibrium. However, since the interests of these researches oriented
toward the structure of urban area, the equilibrium mechanism toward equilibrium in
an urban area was not speciﬁed clearly like the general equilibrium theory. Here we try
to reinforce equilibrium mechanism in the urban economic models to employ a new con-
cept for equilibrium:‘excess utility’ which corresponds to excess demand in the general
equilibrium theory and has an important role in equilibrium analysis.
The basics of our model is as follows. An economy consists of diﬀerent economic
circumstances that each agent can choose freely. The economy has two kinds of goods;
one type of good of which price changes with the circumstances and the other type of
good of which price is constant over the circumstances. These goods which are given
to all agents in certain amounts at an initial state are traded among the agents as an
pure exchange economy. The market clearing condition of all goods does not necessarily
yield a ‘permanent’ but a ‘temporary’ equilibrium of the economy. This is because the
agent distribution over the circumstances is given when the market condition becomes
cleared. If the utilities of agents are diﬀerent in the circumstances and some agents obtain
smaller levels of utility, then those agents will change their location in seeking a better
utility level, which breaks the temporary equilibrium. However such repetition seeking
for a new ‘temporary’ equilibrium attains at a ‘permanent’ equilibrium in the end. The
‘permanent’ equilibrium is the situation in which agents will not change their location
at temporary equilibrium. A new concept of agent’s ‘excess’ utility away from average
utility plays a signiﬁcant role for the permanent equilibrium in Section 3 corresponding
to the market clearing condition of goods. Once the economy satisﬁes the new condition
that agent’s excess utility becomes zero, the economy attains an equilibrium of agent
distribution which results in a permanent equilibrium of the economy.
Another purpose of this paper is to show the property of equilibrium in the economy of
selectable economic circumstances. The property is obtained in the model speciﬁed with
additional assumptions on the agent’s initial holdings of goods and preference for goods,
which approximate our model to the residential location model. The main feature of
2the residential location model is that consumption of residential service or land increases
with the distance from city center, the consumption of composite goods decreases with
the distance, and the price of residential service declines with the distance. This paper
derives the same kind of properties of goods and price like the urban economic model
through the speciﬁcation of the model.
The paper has four sections as follows. In Section 2, a basic model setting is made
following Villar[10] and Debreu [3]. After model building, we shall make a preliminary
analysis of a ‘temporary’ market equilibrium when the location of each agent is given.
Section 3 treats the main task of this paper to prove the market equilibrium when each
agent choose its location freely. Here is given a new condition of excess utility over average
utility. Section 4 gives further analysis of equilibrium which provides some properties of
equilibrium in a speciﬁed economy with additional assumptions on initial endowments
and preference. The result of this section coincides with the results of the residential
location model. Finally the conclusion follows in Section 5.
2 Model setting and ‘temporary’ market equilibrium
First, we will make a model here to perform a preliminary analysis of ‘temporary’ equi-
librium in selectable economic circumstances.
Economic circumstance and goods
An ‘economic circumstance’ is deﬁned as the place of economic activity that brings
the prices of goods and the income of an agent to change. In this paper it is assumed that
economic circumstances are discrete, and that the total number of the circumstances is ˜ j,
indexed by j = 1,2,··· ,˜ j. Each economic agent is assumed to choose only one from the
economic circumstances. Thus the each circumstance is mutually exclusive as a candidate
for agent’s location.
Two types of goods:
• ‘Local goods’ dependent on economic circumstances: the each market of local goods
is formed in each economic circumstance one by one, and then diﬀerent markets
have diﬀerent prices depending on the circumstances. For example diﬀerent values
of rent are bided on diﬀerent points. The number of local goods is assumed to be
1, and Good 1 is the local goods.
• ‘General goods’ independent of economic circumstances: only one market is con-
stituted with all the circumstances for each gneneral good. Then a common price
level of a general good is formed over the economy. Here, the number of the general
goods is assumed to be ˜ l − 1, and the goods are indexed by l = 2,··· ,˜ l.
The prices of goods are denoted by a vector p. Since the local goods form diﬀerent
markets based on the economic circumstances, diﬀerent prices are formed in those cir-
cumstances. Then, the price of a local good at economic circumstance j is denoted by
p1j, and the price of general good 2 to ˜ l, by pl.
p = (p11,p12,··· ,p1j,··· ,p1˜ j | {z }
prices of local goods
, p2,p3,··· ,p˜ l | {z }
prices of general goods
) ∈ P ⊂ R
˜ j+˜ l−1
+
3Economic agent (consumer) and consumption plan
It is assumed that there exist ˜ i types of agents, and that I is the set of agents. Agent
type i is the continuous entity which is a point in the interval Ii ≡ [ai,bi], which is divided
into the intervals Iij that type i consumers locate in j at the initial state. Denote the
number of agents of Ii, n(Ii) as the size of the interval ni = bi − ai > 0, and the number




Let us denote further the size of the type i agents who change his locational point from
j in the initial state to h in the terminal state as nijh. ˜ nij ≡ (nij1,···nij˜ j) is the






















Consumption of goods and its utility
An economic agent selects a consumption plan which maximizes utility under his
budget constraint. This consumption plan here includes the selection of one economic
circumstance. However, Section 2 supposes that each agent makes consumption decision
on an economic circumstance given to him.
The agents of the same type are assumed to be identical in terms of taste in con-
sumption of goods, and then those agents have a identical utility function. The utility
function uij of the type i agent of the initial circumstance j is deﬁned on a consumption
set of R
˜ j+˜ l−1.
Suppose that type i agent of the initial economic circumstance j has moved to the
circumstance h. The consumption vector of the agent at the circumstance h is






˜ lh) ∈ R
˜ j+˜ l−1, (1)
where x
ij
1h is the consumption of goods 1 of the agent type i of the initial circumstance j
at the economic circumstance h, and x
ij
lh(l = 2,··· ,˜ l) is the consumption of the general
goods of the agent. The parts of local goods and general goods are also expressed as
¯ xijh ≡ (0,··· ,0,x
ij





The consumptions of local goods at the circumstances other than h are always zero for
the agent who locates at the circumstance h. Therefore, the only (x
ij
1h, ˜ xijh) determine





4where the consumption element is
(x
ij




Consumption plan and analysis of market equilibrium
We will make an analysis of market equilibrium in two steps in this paper.
Consumption planning in two steps:
Step1: Optimal consumption and market equilibrium under the economic circumstance
given to each agent: an optimal consumption is made when each agent’s location
is given at some economic circumstance. (analysis in Section 2)
Step2: Optimal consumption by selection of economic circumstance: an optimal con-
sumption is made under selection of economic circumstance. (analysis in Section
3)
In Step1 we consider an optimal consumption plan when an economic circumstance
is given to each agent. Since an agent consumes the local good only at his own circum-
stance, the consumption of the good is zero at other circumstances. For example, when
a consumer is the type i agent who moves from the initial economic circumstance j to





lh ≥ 0(l = 2,··· ,˜ l) and x
ij
1m = 0(m = 1,2,··· ,˜ j,m 6= h).
In Step2 each agent will attain his optimal consumption by selection of the most
preferable economic circumstance. All circumstances are the candidates for his loca-
tion, and then each agent tries to maximize utility by reselecting the most preferable
circumstance. If the type i agent of initial circumstance j changes his location from h














Initial endowment of goods and budget set
The agents of a same type are assumed to have an identical initial endowments of
goods, if their initial circumstances are the same location. Although the agents belong
to the same type, if their initial circumstances are diﬀerent then their initial endowments
might be diﬀerent. As for the type i agent of initial circumstance j, his initial holding
of good 1 is denoted as ω
ij
1j, and the initial holdings of other goods, as ω
ij
l . Hence the
initial holdings of goods of the agent of type i at initial circumstance j is







which is decomposed with local goods ¯ ωij ≡ (0,··· ,0,ω
ij
1j,0,··· ,0) and general goods





A consumer is supposed here to decide his optimal consumption with the initial
holdings of goods which is sold to make his incime of budget for consumption plan.
Consumption budget and demand correspondence
The type i agent of the initial economic circumstance j makes purchase of his nec-
essary goods by using the initial holdings of goods ωij. Let us denote the budget set of














1h + ˜ p · xijh ≤ p1jω
ij
1j + ˜ p · ˜ ωij
o
.
5The optimal consumption is the consumption that attains a maximal utility under
the budget set. Since the budget set of an agent depends on the prices of goods and
initial holdings, the optimal consumption, i.e., the consumer’s demand of goods is deter-
mined by those prices and the initial holdings. Looking at the type i agent of the initial
circumstance j who makes consumption plan at the circumstance h, the agent’s demand












































































1h (pj,ph, ˜ p,ω
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1j, ˜ ωij),··· ,ξ





It is assumed that the consumption set, the utility function, and the initial endowment
of goods satisfy the following conditions.
Axiom 1 As for the type i agent of a initial economic circumstance j who makes a




˜ l is a non-empty closed and convex set bounded from below.
(ii) uijh : X
ij
h → R is a continuous, quasi-concave and non-satiable utility function.
(iii) The elements of initial endowments are ωij ∈ X
ij
h , and there exists xij0 ∈ X
ij
h such
that xij0 < ωij.
If we take a large enough positive scalar α > 0, then the consumption xijh can be
smaller than the vector αe, where e = (1,··· ,1). Let us denote the set of consumption





h (α) = {xijh ∈ X
ij
h |xijh ≤ αe}
X
ij
h (α) is a compact set, and the image which X
ij
h (α) projects xijh to R
˜ l is also compact.
A budget set βijh(p1j,p1h, ˜ p,ω
ij
1j, ˜ ωij) is non-empty from Axiom (iii). Then the budget
set is expressed as a non-empty and continuous correspondence form the price set Pjh ⊂
6R
˜ l+2
+ to the goods set X
ij
h (α).1,where Pjh is the set of prices of local goods at j and
h and prices of general goods. Since this is a restricted correspondence to goods set
X
ij
h (α), the budget set is also restricted one. Let us denote this restricted budget set
as ˆ βijh(p1j,p1h, ˜ p,ω
ij
1j, ˜ ωij). The utility function has a maximum on the budget set from
Axiom (ii). Therefore the following theorem is derived from Berge’s maximum theorem
in Appendix. This is the direct application of the typical general equilibrium theory to
this model.
Theorem 1 Suppose that (i), (ii) and (iii) of consumption axioms hold. Let α be a
large enough positive constant such that X
ij
h (α) ⊂ X
ij
h is non-empty. Then, for the
type i agent of the initial economic circumstance j who makes a consumption plan at
circumstance h, its restricted demand correspondence ˆ ξijh is a non-empty, compact and
upper-hemicontinunous correspondence.
Exchange economy
Let us denote the distribution of the type i agents over on the economic circumstances
at an initial state as Iij(i = 1,2,··· ,˜ i,j = 1,2,··· ,˜ j). Since each economic agent is
characterized by the initial endowments of goods, consumption goods set and utility










where n(Iij) is the number of the elements of the set Iij, that is, n(Iij) = nij.
Allocation and feasibility
The allocation of goods in an exchange economy E is expressed by an element of




















i=1 is a feasible allocation if




































l (l = 2,3,··· ,˜ l).
Walras equilibrium in an exchange economy
Walras equilibrium in an exchange economy is the sate of a feasible allocation with






i=1,p∗). This equilibrium is ob-




j=1 is given. If the agent distribution
changes, then the allocation with its supporting price system is not in equilibrium any






i=1,p∗) is temporary because the agent
distribution is given for this equilibrium in the economy.We call this Walras equilibrium
as ‘temporary market equilibrium’.
1See page 106 to 109 of G, Debreu An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium(1959).
7Excess demand correspondence
An agent decides his optimal consumption or demand based on the initial holdings
of goods, and for this purpose the agent makes an exchange of his goods in the markets.
Each economic circumstance forms the demand of Good 1 diﬀerently. At the circumstance






1h (pj,ph, ˜ p,ω
ij
1j,ωij).






1h, the excess demand of


















( h = 1,2,··· ,˜ j). (2)




















( l = 2,··· ,˜ l). (3)
Combine (2) and (3) in order to express as the excess demand vector
ζ(p) ≡ (ζ11(p),··· ,ζ1˜ j(p),ζ2(p),··· ,ζ˜ l(p)) (4)
The excess demand ζ(p) is a mapping ζ : P → Z of R
˜ j+˜ l−1 on R
˜ j+˜ l−1. A temporary
equilibrium is obtained under some agent distribution n being given. What we need for
the proof of the temporary equilibrium is the relation between P and Z in the mapping.
The next theorem is derived from the above preparations for the temporary equilib-
rium.
Theorem 2 :Existence of temporary market equilibrium under the economic
circumstances being given to all agents
Let Z ⊂ R
˜ j+˜ l−1 be a compact set, and ζ : P → Z be an upper hemi-continuous
correspondence with non-empty, compact and convex value. Suppose furthermore that for
all z ∈ ζ(p), and for all ˆ p ∈ ˆ P, ˆ pˆ z = 0 under n being given. Then, there exist ˆ p∗ ∈ ˆ P
and ˆ z∗ ∈ ξ(p∗) such that ˆ z∗
i ≤ 0, with ˆ p∗
i = 0 if ˆ z∗
i < 0.
(Proof)



























l (l = 2,3,··· ,˜ l) to be satis-
ﬁed.
If each agent performs his consumption within the budget, then the following inequal-
ity holds. As for the type i agent of the initial circumstance j who make consumption





1h + ˜ p · ˜ xijh ≤ p1jω
ij
1j + ˜ p · ˜ ωij.
8By summing up the inequalities for all the agents of type i of the initial circumstance
j and the present circumstance h we get
nijhp1hx
ij
1h + nijh˜ p · ˜ xijh ≤ nijhp1jω
ij
1j + nijh˜ p · ˜ ωij.

































nijh˜ p · ˜ ωij.
The left-hand side is the product of the price vector (p11,··· ,p1˜ j,p2,··· ,p˜ l) and the vec-





























˜ lh). The right-hand side is also the product of price





























Therefore, the feasibility (b) is satisﬁed.
2. Proof of that the mapping of price adjustment is non-empty,compact and convex;
Deﬁne a mapping µ : Z → P as follows:
µ(z) = {p ∈ P | p · z ≥ p0 · z,∀p0 ∈ P}
Since P is compact, the continuous function p·z has a maximum on P when z is given.
µ(z) is bounded because P is compact. µ(z) is also closed from the continuous function
p · z. If p and p0 ∈ µ(z) then λp + (1 − λ)p0 ∈ µ(z), for all λ ∈ [0,1] Thus the µ(z) is
convex.
3. Proof of upper hemi-continuousness of µ(z).
p·z is continuous on P ×Z. Take a constant correspondence ν(z) = P for all z ∈ Z.
Then the Maximum theorem concludes that µ(z) is upper hemi-continuous.
4.Proof of existence of ﬁxed points under the restricted demand correspondence.
Since the restricted goods set X
ij
h (α) is a compact set, the elements of this set form
a compact set. It follows from the theorem 1 that the demand correspondence of each
agent, ˆ ξijh is an upper hemicontinunous correspondence with convex values. Then, the
market demands summed up through all economic agents have an upper hemicontinunous
correspondence with convex values, and the excess demand ζ1h(p) and ζl(p) deﬁned by
(2) and (3) also has the same property.
Make a new mapping φ : Z × P → P × Z such that for all (z,p) ∈ Z × P,
φ(z,p) = ζ(p) × µ(z).
Z × P is a non-empty,compact convex set, and φ(z,p) is an upper hemi-continuous cor-
respondence with non-empty, compact and convex values. Thus Kakutani’s ﬁxed point
theorem concludes the existence of a ﬁxed point under the restricted demand correspon-
dence.
95. Proof that xijh∗ maximize utility of the agent under X
ij
h .
Let xijh∗ maximize utility under X
ij













1h + ˜ p · xijh ≤ p1jω
ij
1j + ˜ p · ˜ ωij
o
.




h could attain bigger utility than





1h ,xijh∗). Since (x
ij∗
1h ,xijh∗) is an inner point of























1h ,xijh∗). This contradicts that (x
ij∗
1h ,xijh∗) maxi-
mizes the utility on the X
ij
h (α). Therefore, xijh∗ maximizes the utility on the X
ij
h .
Theorem 2 ensures that a temporary market equilibrium exists when the agent distribu-
tion is given.
3 Market equilibrium under selectable economic circum-
stances
When economic circumstances are given for all economic agents, their maximal utility
levels may become diﬀerent at each circumstance because of the diﬀerent consumptions
of goods at equilibrium. So long as an economic circumstance is given for an agent, this
situation will continue. But, if each agent can choose the best economic circumstance
for his utility maximization, what will happen? Probably each agent tries to choose such
an economic circumstance so as to achieve a highest utility level. For this reason the
number of agents in each circumstance will change and then aﬀect the consumptions of
agents, which creates an another challenge for equilibrium. Therefore we shall analyze
the market equilibrium in the case that each agent can choose an economic circumstance,
that is, in the case of the selectable economic circumstances.
According to Theorem 2, when an allocation of economic agents in the economic
circumstances, i.e., n ≡ (˜ n11, ˜ n12,..., ˜ n˜ i˜ j) is given, there exist some prices of market
equilibriums. If the distribution of agents changes, then some diﬀerent temporal equi-
librium prices will be determined correspondingly. Thus the temporal equilibrium prices
correspond to the distribution of the numbers of agents respectively. Let us denote the
temporal equilibrium prices as ˆ p∗(n), and here we have the next lemma.
Lemma 1 ˆ p∗(n) is upper hemi-continuous with respect to n.
(Proof) Suppose that ˆ p∗0(n0) is a temporal equilibrium price vector at n0, and that
ˆ p∗q ∈ ˆ p∗(nq) is a temporal equilibrium price vector corresponding to nq which converges
to the n0. Further suppose that limnq→n0 ˆ p∗q = ˆ p∗ / ∈ ˆ p∗0(n0). Then since ˆ p∗0(n0) is a
temporal equilibrium price, the excess demand is (∀p∗0 ∈ ˆ p∗0(n0)) : ζ(p∗0) ≤ 0. We get
the next relation.
ζ(ˆ p∗) > 0 ≥ ζ(p∗0) (5)
10On the other hand when nq → n0, the excess demand of local goods and general goods
are
lim




























1h (h = 1,2,··· ,˜ j) (6)
lim




































l (l = 2,··· ,˜ l) (7)
The right-hand side of (6) and (7) is positive form (5). Therefore, for n closer to n0 the






























l (l = 2,··· ,˜ l) (9)
which are both positive. But since ˆ p∗(n) is a temporal equilibrium price, the above
relations are ζ(ˆ p∗(n)) which must be non-positive in equilibrium. That (8) and (9) are
positive contradicts ζ(ˆ p∗(n)) ≤ 0. Therefore we get the relation
lim
nq→n0 ˆ p∗q ∈ ˆ p∗0(n0).
When the type i agent of the initial economic circumstance j makes consumption plan
at h his budget set βijh(p) is a non-empty and continuous correspondence. The utility
function uijh(xijh) is also a continuous function of xijh from Axiom 1-(ii). The demand
correspondence ξijh(p) is upper hemi-continuous on P. Therefore the indirect utility
function uijh(p) = uijh(ξijh(p)) is continuous on P form Berge’s maximum theorem in
the appendix. For saving symbols, let us use the same symbol to denote the indirect utility
function of type i agent as uijh. When the type i agents of the initial circumstance j locate
over all the circumstances to make their consumption, the utilities of the type i agents
are uij(p) ≡ (uij1(p),uij2(p),··· ,uij˜ j(p)). From Lemma 1, the temporal equilibrium
price vector is upper hemi-continuous with respect to the distribution of agents n, and
the indirect utility function uij(p) is continuous with respect to the price p. Then we
obtain the next lemma.
Lemma 2 When a price vector p is a temporal equilibrium price, the utility uij(p(n))
is upper hemi-continuous with respect to n.
11The utilities of all agent types are expressed as
u(p) ≡ (u11(p),u12(p),··· ,uij(p),··· ,u
˜ i˜ j(p)),
which are upper hemi-continuous with respect to n.
‘Excess utility’ and ‘permanent’ equilibrium states of economy
When each agent is freely able to choose his location for his consumption of goods,
he will try to choose a better circumstance for bigger utility. What will be the choice
criterion of economic circumstance by an economic agent? There might be conceived
several ways for it. Here we shall try to construct a mechanism based on diﬀerence from
‘average utility’ of agents.
If the utility of an agent is bigger than the average utility of the same group of agents,
he will think himself in a better state, and if his utility is smaller than the average utility,
he will think that he is in a inferior state and he should take some action for better
utility. The average utility can be a standard level when each agent is to take his action
for better utility. Hence we ﬁrst deﬁne the average utility of the same type agents as
‘average utility’, and next we deﬁne the diﬀerence of each agent’s utility from the average
utility as ‘excess utility’. As long as there exists excess utility, each agent will change
his location to get a better circumstance for him, and then the distribution of one type
group will continue to ﬂuctuate accordingly.
Once the distribution of population ceases to change and remains constant in the
end, an agent will no longer have an incentive to change his location in the economy,
that is, the agent will attain the same utility level with the agents in the same group of
the economy. This can be viewed as an equilibrium state of agent distribution. In what
follows we will formulate this mechanism.
The average utility ¯ uij is a weighted average of utilities of the type i agents of the
initial circumstance j. That is, the average utility ¯ uij is the weighted average utility with









1j, ˜ ωij) (10)
Deﬁne the diﬀerence of each agent’s utility from the average utility of the agent type
as ‘excess utility’. The excess utility vijh of the type i agent of the initial circumstance
j at the circumstance h is
vijh(n) ≡ uijh(p(n);ω
ij
1j, ˜ ωij) − ¯ uij(n). (11)
The excess utilities of the type i at all circumstances are expressed by a vector, vij(n) ≡
(vij1(n),··· ,vij˜ j(n)). The excess utilities of all agent types are
v(n) ≡ (v11(n),··· ,v
˜ i˜ j(n)).
The set V ij of the excess utilities of the type i agents of the initial economic circum-
stance j can be deﬁned so as to be compact and convex.
V ij ⊆ R
˜ j
12We can ﬁnd the compactness and convexity of the set V ij as follows. First, take any
two vij and vij0
of V ij and make a convex combination λvij +(1−λ)vij0
,(λ ≥ 0). The ex-
cess utilities vij and vij0
of V ij correspond to the consumptions ((x
ij
11, ˜ xij1),··· ,(x
ij






1˜ j , ˜ xij˜ j0
)) respectively. Since the consumption set X
ij
h (h = 1,2,··· ,˜ j)
with (x
ij




h is also convex. There exits an price p to support a
convex combination λ((x
ij
11, ˜ xij1),··· ,(x
ij





1˜ j , ˜ xij˜ j0
)),




h . Therefore, λvij +(1−λ)vij0
,(λ ≥ 0) can be achieved
under the price p to be in the V ij, that is V ij is convex.
Next, the consumption set X
ij
h (α) is compact, and the utility function uijh is contin-
uous with respect to consumption. Then the image of consumption set X
ij
h (α) by utility
function uijh is also compact, which in turn makes the excess utility set V ij compact.
Therefore, the excess utility set V ij is compact and convex.






V ij ⊆ R
˜ i˜ j˜ j.
The mapping of excess utility is v : N → V . Since the average utility uij(n) is upper
hemi-continuous with respect to n, the excess utility vij(n) is also upper hemi-continuous
with respect to n from (10) and (11). Therefore the excess utility v is upper hemi-
continuous with respect to the agent distribution n.
Lemma 3 A mapping v(n) is upper hemi-continunous on the population distribution set
N.
Equilibrium under the economy with selectable economic circumstances
In Section 2, the temporal economic equilibrium is deﬁned under the economy with a
given distribution of agents. Here we deﬁne the equilibrium in the case that each agent
can choose his location for consumption freely.
Deﬁne the equilibrium of exchange economy as the feasible allocation with a support-











It is the temporal equilibrium in which each agent will not change his economic circum-















i=1) will not change any more. The corre-





i=1,p∗) will not change either. There-
fore, this equilibrium is a ‘permanent’ equilibrium in the meaning that the equilibrium
will not change so long as the distribution of agents remaining in the same state. Here
we call this ‘permanent’ equilibrium as market equilibrium.
Deﬁne a mapping gij(vij) : V ij → Nij of the type i agents of the initial circumstance
as
gij(vij) ≡ {˜ nij ∈ Nij|˜ nij · vij ≥ ˜ n0 · vij, ∀˜ n0 ∈ Nij}
Lemma 4 ˜ nij · vij = ˜ nij·vij(n)= 0 for n = (˜ n11,··· , ˜ nij,··· , ˜ n˜ i˜ j)Cvij = vij(n).
13(Proof)
˜ nij · vij = (nij1,nij2,··· ,nij˜ j)(vij1(n),vij2(n),··· ,vij˜ j(n))

























Lemma 5 gij(vij) is non-empty, compact and convex.
(Proof) Since N is compact, and ˜ nij · v
ij is continuous on Nij ⊆ N, ˜ nij · v
ij necessarily
has its ﬁnite value.
The gij(vij) is bounded because of compactness of N and closed from the deﬁnition
of gij(·). Then gij(vij)is compact.
The convexity of gij(vij) can be shown as follows. Make a convex combination λ˜ nij+
(1 − λ)˜ n0
ij of ˜ nij, ˜ n0
ij ∈ gij(vij) for 0 < λ < 1. We conduct the next calculation to the
convex combination.
(λ˜ nij + (1 − λ)˜ n0




ij · vij + (1 − λ)˜ n
00








Thus λ˜ nij + (1 − λ)˜ n0
ij ∈ gij(vij).
Lemma 6 The correspondence gij(vij) is upper hemi-continuous with respect to vij.
(Proof) The lemma is proved by using Berge’s Maximum theorem.
nij · vij is continuous on Nij × V ij. Next, we make the correspondence δij : V ij →
Nij so that δij(vij) = Nij holds for each vij. This constant correspondence δi is contin-
uous.
Therefore δij(vij) = Nij is upper hemi-continuous form Maximum theorem.
Let us deﬁne the correspondence g(v) by use of gij(vij).
g(v) ≡ (g11(v11),g12(v12),··· ,g
˜ i˜ j(v
˜ i˜ j))
that is, g : V → N.
14Lemma 7 The correspondence g(v) is upper hemi-continuous with respect to v.
(Proof) Take any point v0 of V . Next If we take v so that its element vijq →
vij0(i = 1,··· ,˜ i,j = 1,··· ,˜ j), then vq → v0. Now that ˜ n
q
ij ∈ gij(vijq) from the upper
hemi-continuousness of gij(vij) and ˜ n
q
ij → ˜ n0
ij, we get ˜ n0
ij ∈ gij(vij0) for each ˜ n0
ij of
n0 = (˜ n0
11, ˜ n0
12,··· , ˜ n0
˜ i˜ j). Thus we obtain n0 ∈ g(v0) when vq → v0.
Theorem 3 : Existence of market equilibrium
Suppose that V ⊂ Rh is compact and convex set, v : N → V is upper hemi-continuous
correspondence with non-empty compact and convex value, and further that vn = 0 for
all v ∈ v(n) and all n ∈ N. Then, there exist n∗ ∈ N,v∗ ∈ v(n∗) such that v∗ ≤ 0, with
n∗
h = 0 if v∗
h < 0.
(Proof) Deﬁne the mapping µ : V × N → N × V as follows.
µ(v,n) = g(v) × v(n) for ∀(v,n) ∈ V × N
Then V × N is a non-empty compact set because V and N are both non-empty
compact sets. Since ξ is upper hemi-continuous correspondence with non-empty compact
convex value from Theorem 1, v has also the same property. g is also upper hemi-
continuous correspondence with non-empty compact convex value from Lemma 5 and 7.
Therefore µ has the same property.
Then there exists (v∗,n∗) ∈ µ(v∗,n∗) from Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem. That
is,
n∗ ∈ g(v∗), v∗ ∈ ζ(n∗),
0 = n∗v∗ ≥ nv∗ ∀n ∈ N
Since n ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N and 0 / ∈ V , we get v∗ ≤ 0. If v∗
k < 0 then, n∗
k = 0.
According to Theorem 3 there exist some utility level that agent distribution will
not change and remain constant, when each agent is able to choose an economic circum-
stance for his utility maximization. Such values are the utility and the agent distribution
of ‘permanent’ equilibrium. The corresponding equilibrium values of consumptions and
prices which are determined by Theorem 2 are the ‘permanent’ equilibrium of prices and
consumptions. Hence Theorem 3 with Theorem 2 guarantees ‘permanent’ market equilib-
rium when each agent is able to choose an economic circumstance. In other words, these
theorems have extended the existence of market equilibrium to the case of the selectable
economic circumstances. The economic models in which the price of some goods changes
in diﬀerent locations such as residential location and public service consumption location
can be uniﬁed and studied by our model, which might be contribution to economics.
154 Properties of the equilibrium under selectable economic
circumstances
What is the properties of equilibrium solutions? Our interests in the properties awakes
the investigation in the study of equilibrium analysis. For this purpose the model needs to
be speciﬁed in more detail, because it is too general to investigate such properties. Since
the model of this paper copes with selectable economic circumstances, the speciﬁcation
of the model is made in the direction of the urban residential model that consumers
face to diﬀerent prices of land rent in a city. Then we will analyze the properties of the
equilibrium solutions with an approach to urban residential model.
Urban residential location model
First we review the urban economic model with a monocentric city2. The monocentric
urban city model has a circular city that has a central business district(CBD) in the city
center. The residents commute to the city center to work and to earn same income. They
make consumption of goods and service with the disposable incomes after commuting
cost. Since the consumers are assumed to be identical in taste, they attain the same
level of utility in equilibrium. The given rent at city boundary and the exogenous urban
population enables us to obtain the utility level of consumers in the city.
It is clear from the analysis of the residential location model that the quantity of
housing service (land) is increasing with the distance from the city center, and that the
price of housing service become decreasing with the distance. Generally the interest of
the analysis relates to the eﬀects of the change of parameters on economic variables. The
parameters are the exogenous population size, land rent at city boundary, consumer’s
income and commuting cost parameter that inﬂuence the quantity and price of housing
service, the city size and consumer’s utility level.
The assumptions of urban residential location model
The setting of a basic residential location model are:
U1. Each location point is distinguished according to the distance from the city center.
U2. All consumers reside in a city and commute to the CBD to work.
U3. All consumers earn the same nominal income.
U4. The income after the commuting cost, which is spent on the consumption of the
goods and service, is diﬀerent depending on the distance to the city center from
the residence.
U5. A consumer has the same preference on goods and service and the utility function
is identical.
U6. The consumer’s taste to goods and service is unrelated to the residential location.
U7. The goods and service for consumption are housing service (land) and composite
goods.
U8. The urban population is given in a ﬁxed size for a closed city model.
2For example, see Brueckner,‘The Structure of Urban Equilibria: A Uniﬁed Treatment of the Muth-
Mills Mode’(1987).
16U9. The land rent (agricultural land rent) at a city boundary is given exogenously.
Consistency with the assumptions of the urban residential model
To reside in a locational point in the city described in U1 and 2 corresponds to locate
a diﬀerent economic circumstance of this model. However, our model is fundamentally
diﬀerent from the urban residential location model on the assumption of income. While
the initial endowments of goods is the source of income in our model, the money income
is given in the urban residential model. From U4 the diposable income after commuting
cost which is spent on goods and service becomes smaller with the distance from the
city center. The problem is how to correspond the initial endowments to the disposable
income. The utility function of U5 is basically consistent with our model. The U6 is the
typical setting in the urban residential model, and the taste of goods can be also modeled
to be indiﬀerent from economic circumstances in a basic model. The housing service or
the land rent of which price diﬀers in the distance from the city center in U7, corresponds
to the local goods of the model of this paper, and the composite goods correspond to
the general goods. The ﬁxed population size in U8 matches the given size of agents in
the economy of our model. While the city size is determined by U9, the size of economic
environments is given in our model.
Thus the essential points to approximate our model to the urban residential location
are :
1. The money income is a common value in the entire city.
2. the disposable income deducted after commutation expense decreases successively
with the distance form the city center.
Here we employ the following assumptions on the initial endowments of goods.
Assumption 1 Each agent of the same type has the same quantities of local goods and
general goods as initial holdings, which are irrespective with economic circumstances, that
is,
(i) Local goods : ωi1
11 = ωi2
12 = ··· = ω
ij
1j = ··· = ω
i˜ j
1˜ j (i = 1,2,··· ,˜ i)
(ii) General goods : ωi1
l = ωi2
l = ··· = ω
ij
l = ··· = ω
i˜ j
l
(i = 1,2,··· ,˜ i, l = 2,3,··· ,˜ l)
This assumption of initial endowments matches with the constant money income of the
residential location model. The income to be spent on goods should be diﬀerent according
to the economic circumstances. It is plausible that the income for consumption changes
depending on economic circumstances because of some kind of transportation like the
urban economic model. We assume here that while each agent can hold the initial
holdings of local good for consumption or income without loss at initial state, he can only
use smaller quantities of general goods because of some kind of loss like transportation.
Then we set as follows.
Assumption 2 Local goods and general goods for consumption;
(i) Local goods can be used in the initial endowments without loss of quantities.
17(ii) The quantities of initial endowments of general goods can be used less easily as the
number of an economic circumstance is larger.The degree of ease for consumption
appears as reduction of the amount of the initial possession of general goods, and the
degree is expressed by the residual coeﬃcient of the quantities of initial endowments.
The residual coeﬃcient in each economic circumstance ajis 3
1 = a1 > a2 > ··· > a˜ j > 0.
An agent’s preference for goods with respect to economic circumstance is assumed in
the followings.
Assumption 3 An agent’s preference doesn’t change by the diﬀerence of the economic
circumstance.
Budget constraint and equilibrium solution
We shall show that the model under Assumption 1, 2 and 3 has market equilibrium.
The diﬀerence from Section 2 is the budget that is speciﬁed in more detail in this section.
When a type i agent of the initial circumstance j makes consumption plan, his bud-
get for consumption of goods changes depending on his economic circumstance. His
disposable income will be p1jω
ij
1j + ah˜ p · ˜ ωij if his circumstance is h, and it will be
p1jω
ij
1j + ah0˜ p · ˜ ωij if his circumstance is h0. When a type i agent of the initial circum-
stance j makes a consumption plan at h, his budget set becomes
βijh(p1j,p1h, ˜ p,ω
ij










1h + ˜ p · ˜ xijh ≤ p1jω
ij
1j + ah˜ p · ˜ ωij
o
.
While the feasible condition of market equilibrium is the same as Section 2 as for local

















l (l = 2,3,··· ,˜ l).
In addition the excess demand correspondence of local goods is the same as Section





















( l = 1,2,··· ,˜ l).
We can apply the analysis of Section 2 to the local goods, and it is only necessary
for us to show that the feasible condition of general goods is satisﬁed. If the conditions
are fulﬁlled, then the argument on the proof of the theorem 2 in Section 2 will applied
to this section as it is, and market equilibrium will exist.
We shall exhibit that the feasible conditions of the general goods are fulﬁlled. When




1h + ˜ p · ˜ xijh ≤ p1jω
ij
1j + ah˜ p · ˜ ωij.
3Here we assume the ‘iceberg’ type transportation cost.
18The number of the type i agents of the initial circumstance j who change his circumstance
form j to h is nijh. By summing up the budget constraints of those agents,
nijhp1hx
ij
1h + nijh˜ p · ˜ xijh ≤ nijhp1jω
ij
1j + nijhah˜ p · ˜ ωij.


































nijhah˜ p · ˜ ωij.
The LHS and the RHS are arranged as follows.



































































Comparison of the corresponding each elements of quantity vectors in LHS and RHS
brings to show that those are the feasible conditions (b). Therefore the economy of this
section has market equilibrium.
Theorem 4 The model of Section 2 has market equilibrium under Assumption 1, 2 and
3.
Properties of market equilibrium
We shall analyse the properties of market equilibrium. In the followings, we attach




lh (h,j = 1,··· ,˜ j,l = 2,··· ,˜ l).
First, we ﬁnd that the consumptions cannot be the same as the initial holdings, that

















l . This is because the initial holdings for the consumption of general goods will
decrease depending on the increase in number of circumstances from Assumption 2, and
then the same type agent will consume diﬀerent general goods, which lead to diﬀerent to
utility levels. Therefore the equilibrium consumption must be diﬀerent from the initial
holdings.
We will clarify the properties of market equilibrium through the analysis of equilib-
rium quantities of the type i agent of the initial circumstance j.
Lemma 8 Under Assumption 1,2 and 3 the consumptions of the local goods at economic









(Proof) This is proved by contradiction. Suppose that the consumptions of local goods
























































kh0,(k = 2,··· ,˜ l). This means that the
consumptions of local goods and general goods at h and h0 are equal respectively. But,
as we already have argued, the consumptions at diﬀerent economic circumstances cannot






From Lemma 8 the consumptions of the local goods at any h and h0 are limited to








1h0. The possible combination of general goods and









































kh0 then the agent
at h can consume more than the agent at h0, which makes the utility of agent at h bigger













kh0 cannot be in equilibrium either. Therefore possible
combination of consumptions are (12) and (13).
Further analysis shows that the only latter case, (13) holds in an equilibrium.
Property 1 Under Assumption 1, 2 and 3 the equilibrium consumptions of the local





























contradicts the relation of disposable incomes
p1jω
ij
1j + ah˜ p · ˜ ωij > p1jω
ij
1j + ah0˜ p · ˜ ωij.




kh(k = 2,3,··· ,˜ l) are p1h and pk. The next
relation follows from the quasi-concavity of preference.
p1jω
ij















On the other hand, when the consumptions at the circumstance h0 meet with the





















































Thus p1h < p1h0.


















1j + ah0˜ p · ˜ ωij (17)
(14) and (17) give us the relation
p1jω
ij
1j + ah˜ p · ˜ ωij < p1jω
ij
1j + ah0 ˜ p · ˜ ωij.
This contradicts the premise of budgets at economic circumstance h and h0
p1jω
ij
1j + ah˜ p · ˜ ωij > p1jω
ij
1j + ah0˜ p · ˜ ωij.












kh0 cannot be in an













kh0 in an equilibrium.
21Property 2 Under Assumption 1, 2 and 3 the equilibrium prices of the local goods at
h < h0 are p1h > p1h0.
(Proof)

































































1h0), which means p1h0 < p1h.
What we have shown is in property 1 and 2; If an agent’s initial holdings of goods
and the initial general goods are identical but decreases like ‘iceberg’ when he changes
his location, then 1: among the agents who are the same type and the same initial
economic circumstance, the agent’s consumption of local goods increases with the number
of circumstance and the expenditure on the circumstance general goods decreases with the
number of circumstance, and 2: the price of the local goods decreases with the number
of circumstance. It might be viewed that this results correspond with the residential
location model in urban economics and the economic model of this section approximates
it well.
However there still exists diﬀerence between the two models. Property 1 of this
paper insists that the properties of goods consumption in equilibrium holds only among
the same type agents who are in the same initial economic circumstance. By contrast,
in the residential location model the consumption of residential service increases and the
consumption of composite goods decreases with distance in an equilibrium. That is, the
consumption of those goods at a location closer to the city center is larger than that
at a location farther from the city center. The diﬀerence comes from whether a model
assumes the initial location of agents or not. The residential model does not assume the
initial location of agents and it leads the general property of consumption of goods. But
the model of this paper assumes the initial location of agents, and then the property of
consumption of goods hold only the same agents who are in the same initial circumstance.
So if we restrict the model of this paper to allow only one type of agents who locate in
22the only one economic circumstance at the initial state, then the results would be same
as the residential location model. Therefore from the point of the general equilibrium
the residential location model can be viewed that the residents who are in one location
at initial time spread over urban areas to locate in equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
We have analyzed market equilibrium of pure exchange economy under selectable eco-
nomic circumstances in this paper.
The eminent feature of this paper is that there are some goods of which prices change
with circumstance, and that an agent is able to choose a circumstance for his consump-
tion of goods. The one of the main purposes of this paper is to prove the existence of
market equilibrium in such an economy, and we have obtained Theorem 3. Preceding
to Theorem 3, we proved Theorem 2: ‘a temporary’ equilibrium’ which is derived when
agent distribution is given. This is the direct application of typical general equilibrium
theory to our model.
Finally we obtained Theorem 3: market equilibrium which is viewed as ‘permanent’
equilibrium. This market equilibrium is derived in the case that each agent is able to
choose an economic circumstance for his utility maximization. There exists a common
utility level of each agent type and its supported agent distribution over circumstances on
this equilibrium. Therefore this paper has extended the existence of market equilibrium
to the case of selectable economic circumstances. The economic models in which the
price of some goods changes in diﬀerent locations such as residential location and public
service consumption location can be uniﬁed and studied by our model, which might be
contribution to economics.
In Section 4 we have derived some properties about consumptions and prices of equi-
librium in the model speciﬁed in Assumption 1, 2 and 3, which approximate our model
to the residential location model of urban economics.The assumptions employed in Sec-
tion 4 are that the initial holdings of goods of agents are identical regardless of economic
circumstances and those reduce like ‘iceberg’ depending on their locations when they con-
sume, and that agent’s preference for goods is independent of economic circumstances.
By this speciﬁcation we have derived the same result of goods and prices as the residen-
tial location model. In this meaning the model speciﬁed in the Section 4 is thought to
approximate the residential location model well. At the same time the residential loca-
tion model can be viewed that the agents who locate at one location point at initial state
spread over urban areas to locate in equilibrium from the point of the general equilibrium
analysis.
However we have still some limitations in this model. The ﬁrst point is the assumption
on the consumption of local goods. This paper assumes that an agent consumes goods
in the circumstance that he choose. An agent could consume goods at more than two
circumstances generally and theoretically, which is excluded in this paper. But our
assumption may be partially justiﬁed because the goods such as local goods is consumed
only at the locatinal circumstance of an agent like residence.
The second point is that our analysis is made on based on discrete economic cir-
cumstances. If we would pursue more strict correspondence with the typical model of
residential location in urban economics, then the continuous economic circumstances
should have been assumed. The results upon the continuous assumption of cirucum-
23stance would be applied more generally. However we have employed the assumption of
discrete economic circumstances in this paper because of simplicity and tractability of
analysis. This assumption should be relaxed for more general analysis in future research.
The third point is that our analysis is based on a pure exchange economy which lacks
the production side of a market economy. This is just because of simplicity of analysis.
For more complete analysis it is preferable to take the such aspect into consideration.
The inclusion of production side will needs some consideration on assumption of pro-
duction sites, that is, whether production activity take place in every circumstance for




Suppose that D ⊂ Rk and X ⊂ Rl are compact. Further suppose that β : D → X
is a non-empty continuous correspondence, u : X → R is a continuous function, and
ξ : D → X is ξ(d) = {x ∈ β(d)|u(x) have maximum.}. Then the correspondence ξ is
upper hemi-continuous, and the function v(d) = u(x) is continuous.
Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem
Let K be a non-empty compact and convex subset, and Γ : K → K be a upper
hemi-continuous correspondence with non-empty compact and convex value. Then there
exists a ﬁxed point x∗ ∈ Γ(x∗).
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